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Paul Baer Ph.D. Student |
Barbara Haya
M.S. student |
Antonia Herzog
Postdoctoral Fellow |
Nathan Hultman
Ph.D. student |
Leigh Raymond* Lecturer | |
Energy and Resources Group
University of California, Berkeley
*Environmental Studies Program |
Disagreement over principles for the inclusion of developing countries in future global greenhouse gas caps remains an obstacle to the ratification and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol. We argue that a transition from allocations based on past emissions (grandfathering), such as the Kyoto Protocol embodies for the industrialized nations, to allocations a new regime based on equal per capita emissions rights, is a necessary and fair solution that can lead to a an effective global reduction regime. Such an allocation is consistent with numerous ethical principles and legal precedents, could facilitate trading in emissions permits, and can be implemented through a transitional period that accommodates the different situations and emissions levels of various countries.
Our goal is to bring issues of equity into the general discussion surrounding climate change mitigation and particularly into the negotiations prior to and during COP6 where the issues of developing country participation in the reduction of global carbon emissions are currently being discussed. Our ideas were recently published in the Policy Forum section of the September 29, 2000 issue of Science where we defend our arguments on scientific, economic and ethical grounds.
RAEL faculty and students have also been participating in public awareness and political campaigns to analyze and promote ideas for North-South cooperation and agreement on strategies to manage global greenhouse emissions, and have been signatories on letters in The Guardian and The Independent.
Background
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
codified an international consensus that control of greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions is necessary to prevent "dangerous anthropogenic
interference with the climate system" (Article 2). The wisdom of
this consensus is supported by an extensive body of scientific
research, and most recently by evidence from terrestrial temperature
surveys (1), ocean warming measurements (2), a decrease in Northern
Hemisphere sea ice (3) and climate models (4). Each of these studies
are independently consistent with theoretical predictions of
human-induced changes in climate.
Parties to the UNFCCC subsequently negotiated binding commitments
for industrialized nations under the Kyoto Protocol. These commitments
apply to developed nations only, in consideration of their
disproportionate share of current and past GHG emissions and the
greater resources available to them to reduce emissions.
This decision reflected the UNFCCC consensus that industrialized
countries should take the lead in mitigating climate change and that
participation by developing countries should not impair their ability
to develop.
Meaningful Participation: by and for each nation
Despite the UNFCCC mandate, the U.S. government has conditioned
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol on "meaningful participation" by
developing nations. By imposing this requirement without offering a
solution to the concerns of developing countries for an equitable
allocation of emissions, the U.S. may effectively block the
implementation of the Protocol or the negotiation of future global
mitigation policies. Developing countries will not, and cannot
reasonably be expected to, restrict their emissions if their long-term
interests are not addressed. Furthermore, in the long run, an
international agreement is unlikely to be stable if perceived to be
unfair by some of its signatories (5, 6). Given that global emissions
must eventually be limited to rates well below current levels, we
argue that any long-term allocation of emissions should be based on
the principle of equal per capita rights to the atmospheric commons
(7).
Today, global per capita carbon emissions average about one ton per
year (8, 9). U.S. per capita emissions exceed 5 tC/year while Western
Europe and Japan emit 2 - 5 tC/year per capita. In comparison, average
per capita emissions are about 0.6 tC/year in the developing world,
and more than 50 developing countries have emissions under
0.2 tC/year (10). Yet, in order to prevent atmospheric GHG
levels from exceeding twice pre-industrial levels average
worldwide emissions must be stabilized at levels below 3 GtC/year,
or 0.3 tC/year per capita for a future world population anticipated
to stabilize near 10 billion people (11).
The Kyoto Protocol assigned emissions caps to the Annex I countries
based on their 1990 emissions levels (an allocation often called
"grandfathering). It successfully arbitrated the diverse interests
of its signers into one agreement (12), and has consequently prompted
the development of global and national mechanisms for measuring and
reducing emissions, which are important first steps for future, more
significant reductions. However, by basing future emissions caps on
past levels, the Protocol rewards historically high emitters and
penalizes low emitters. Developing countries recognize that the
industrialized nations have based their own development on
unrestricted fossil fuel use, so they see restrictions on their
own emissions to per capita levels below those of industrialized
countries as perpetuating global inequality (13, 14). A fair long-term agreement involving all countries will require a transition from an allocation method based on grandfathering past emissions to one based on equal per capita emissions limits (15).
A per capita allocation is attractive and can work because it is
simple and a priori. Most of the alternatives under consideration
blend historic emissions with a posteriori, or outcome-based,
information. The latter presumes that the consequences of climate
change for different nations and the abilities of different nations
to ameliorate or adapt to climate change can be understood and agreed
upon in advance. While empirical evidence increasingly complements the
scientific predictions of global climate change, scientists have also
become aware that the ways in which climate change will manifest
itself in specific regions, especially the timing of particularly
disruptive climate events, is much more difficult to predict.
Debate could continue endlessly over whether rich countries heavily
invested in hydrocarbon-based energy infrastructure can reduce their
emissions more easily than poor countries just starting down the
hydrocarbon path. These many regional and temporal uncertainties of
climate change argue pragmatically for a simpler a priori approach to
the allocation of
emission rights. Per capita allocations of greenhouse gas rights and
responsibilities provides that framework.
Furthermore, a long-term agreement that allocates emission rights
unequally would allow higher emitters to impose damages caused by
their emissions onto other countries, in violation of the widely
accepted "polluter pays" principle. As CO2 content in the atmosphere
is well mixed, climate change and the local damages it causes are a
function of total emissions, regardless of where the emissions
originate. Ironically, the nations that have contributed the least
to climate change will likely be the least able to adapt to its
negative impacts, having the fewest available resources and being
generally the most dependent on the land and existing climate
patterns for day-to-day subsistence.
This disparity between the largest polluters and those who are
most vulnerable to the impacts of the pollution directly contravenes
international environmental law. Principle 21 of the Declaration of
the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, cited
in Article 1 of the UNFCCC, states that the exercise of nations'
"sovereign right to exploit their own resources" must not cause
environmental damage to other states or to areas beyond that state's
national jurisdiction. The U.S. and other industrialized countries
accordingly have a legal as well as ethical obligation not to harm
more vulnerable nations through their disproportionate use of the
atmospheric commons.
The Precedent for Equity
From an ethical perspective, it is difficult to maintain that some
people are entitled to a larger claim or right to the global
atmospheric commons than others. That all people have equal rights
is a fundamental principle of most modern ethical and legal codes.
The idea is enshrined in the U.S. Constitution and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and is a fundamental principle of
democracy. It is especially relevant to the use and distribution of
common pool resources such as the atmosphere that exist outside the
legal control of individuals or nation-states.
Existing international agreements regarding such common pool
resources contain precedents for egalitarian allocation policies.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, for example, requires common
ownership of deep-sea resources for the benefit of all humanity
(16, 17). Similar provisions in the Protocol on Environmental
Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (in Article 7) prevent
appropriation of any portion of the region's mineral wealth by any
individual nation (18). While these treaties do not create explicit
per capita allocations, they clearly recognize the equal rights and
responsibilities of all persons with respect to global common
resources.
Perhaps more importantly, governments have adopted egalitarian
principles in allocating resource rights even in cases where there
were large pre-existing claims. The United States has on several
occasions used egalitarian principles to modify entitlements based
on historic use. The Public Trust Doctrine is a powerful part of
Anglo-American common law ensuring access to inland water resources
on egalitarian principles (19). Air pollution rights have also been
subject to such principles; for example, under the U.S. Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990, allowances to emit SO2 were not simply
grandfathered but rather granted on a significantly egalitarian basis
with decreasing consideration granted over time to historic emission
levels (20). The long-term per-capita allocation of CO2 emission
rights would build on these established egalitarian precedents.
Critics of a per capita allocation focus on two objections; first,
that it is not politically realistic as it implies substantial
transfers of resources from current high to low emitters, and second,
that it would encourage population growth. The latter concern is
easily addressed, for example, by choosing a fixed base-year
population or by determining a population baseline incorporating
reasonable declines in population growth rates (5, 21). As to the
former objection, we have already argued to the contrary that
agreements grandfathering unequal emissions levels are not realistic,
since developing countries are unlikely to accept permanent
restrictions on per capita emissions levels lower than those of
industrialized nations. A long-term agreement based on equal per
capita emissions already represents a compromise limiting the
liability of the industrialized nations for their historical
emissions, while refusing to permanently grandfather those
emissions. Moreover, as we have demonstrated, there is substantial
ethical and legal justification for the position of the developing
countries. Thus if the primary goal of the UNFCCC is to be met, it
is necessary to combine the principle of equal per capita allocations
with a phase-in period recognizing the diverse situations
and emission levels of different countries.
By enabling the negotiation of a global emissions cap, a commitment
to an equal per capita allocation also strengthens any proposed carbon
trading mechanism, reducing the overall cost of compliance.
Supporters of global trading in emissions recognize the advantages
of a complete allocation of emission rights among market participants
(22). Without a global cap on emissions, trading between developed
and developing nations, as contemplated for example under the Clean
Development Mechanism, will risk permitting greater emissions for
developed nations without reducing total emissions in the developing
world (23).
The Way Forward
The upcoming sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6) to the UNFCCC in The
Hague offers a critical opportunity to resolve the existing deadlock.
Two of the primary goals of this meeting are to provide a political
deadline to trigger the ratification of the treaty by the
industrialized nations and to motivate significant action by
developing countries to enhance their contributions to the
achievement of the Convention's objectives. Adoption of a
long-term principle of equal per capita emission rights could
resolve the objections of both developed and developing country
parties that stand in the way of these goals and allow climate
negotiations to move forward. We urge the U.S. to recognize the
fairness and practicality of this approach, and make this central
to its proposal for implementing and moving beyond the Kyoto Protocol (24).
Last updated 10/14/2000
References and Notes